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The implications of massive high frequency trading are becoming increasingly clear in equity 
markets and other financial markets. In recent years high frequency trading has not only 
increased vastly in US equity trading, but in the last ten years has extended widely to other 
major international exchanges. High frequency trading from its origins attracted the interest 
of regulators concerned about the impact on market integrity and stability. However it was 
the publication of Michael Lewis‘s best-selling book Flash Boys that alerted the world to the 
imminent dangers of high frequency trading. Regulators are now confronted with the 




Thomas Clarke                       
t.clarke@uts.edu.au 





High Frequency Trading in Dark Pools 
2 
 
High Frequency Trading and Dark Pools: Sharks Never Sleep 
Introduction 
The dangers of massive high frequency trading are becoming increasingly clear in equity 
markets and other financial markets. High frequency trading (HFT) is a form of algorithmic 
trading performed by computers, to rapidly move into and out of tradition positions in micro-
seconds in order to capture fractions of a cent profit on every trade, which when magnified by 
millions of trades quickly yields a substantial return. In contrast to traditional buy and hold 
investment strategies, HFT firms do not need to employ large amounts of capital, do not 
accumulate positions, nor hold portfolios overnight. Trading on tiny margins, their large 
gains are through speed and frequency combined with fractionally earlier access to 
information.
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 The awesome power of this technologically driven approach to trading is hard 
to imagine: in a single day in October 2008 one high frequency trading firm exchanged over 
2 billion shares, amounting to 10%  of US equities trading volume for the day.
2
 Carol C. 
Clarke of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago accurately captures the technical essence of 
this radical automation of trading: 
―A small group of high-frequency algorithmic trading firms have invested heavily in 
technology to leverage the nexus of high-speed communications, mathematical 
advances, trading, and high-speed computing. By doing so, they are able to complete 
trades at lightning speeds. High-frequency algorithmic trading strategies rely on 
computerized quantitative models that identify which type of financial instruments to 
buy or sell (e.g., stocks, options, or futures), as well as the quantity, price, timing, and 
location of the trades. These so-called black boxes are capable of reading market data, 
transmitting thousands of order messages per second to an exchange, cancelling and 




replacing orders based on changing market conditions, and capturing price 
discrepancies with little or no human intervention.‖3 
In recent years high frequency trading has not only increased vastly in US equity trading, but 
in the last ten years has extended widely to other major international exchanges in Europe 
and the Asia Pacific, and is now spreading to emerging markets driven by the growth of 
proprietary trading firms and quantitative hedge fund strategies (Figure 1 and 2). As 
technology has developed high frequency trading has moved beyond equity markets to other 
asset classes including futures, options, bonds, and foreign exchange. For example according 
to the Commodity and Futures Commission (CTFC) in July 2011, 95% of US crude oil 
futures trading volume is generated by day trading with a large proportion generated by high 
frequency trading.
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Figure  1 
High-Frequency Percentage of Volume of 
US Equity Shares Traded  2006-2014e 
 
Figure 2 
High Frequency Percentage of Value of 
European Equity Shares Traded   2008-2012 
 
High frequency trading from its origins attracted the interest of regulators concerned about 
the impact on market integrity and stability.
5
 The ‗flash crash‘ on 6 May 2010 when the Dow 
Jones plunged $1 trillion in market value in the space of half an hour alerted regulators and 
the investing public to the imminent dangers of high frequency trading. However it was only 
with the publication of Michal Lewis book Flash Boys on 31 March 2014 that the world 
realised suddenly that ―Over the past decade, the financial markets have changed too rapidly 
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for our mental picture of them to remain true to life.‖6 Lewis, an investment bank insider, 
who had encapsulated the irrational behaviour at the root of the global financial crisis in 
Liar’s Poker, begins his new Amazon best seller with the mystery of why a network company 
should build an 827 mile cable between Chicago and New Jersey in order to reduce the 
journey time of the data from 17 to 13 milliseconds? As the work unfolds the enormous 
trading advantage of speed is revealed, and how opportunities are created to continuously 
intervene in the market ahead of other investors employing traditional strategies and 
technologies. 
At the heart of this controversy could simply be the waste of human talent and effort 
employed in pursuing high frequency trading which may be profitable but is simply 
unproductive: "The greatest tragedy of high-frequency trading may simply be the wasted 
capital, both physical and human, in the quest for arbitrage profit. The $300 million cable 
from Chicago to New York added no tangible societal benefit despite its price tag. Wall 
Street firms have accelerated their recruiting of the best academic and technological talent in 
the country in order to run HFT groups, often siphoning these employees from universities 
and productive businesses.‖7 
Within a day of the Lewis books release the FBI called an investigation into high frequency 
trading, focusing on whether this might involve front running, market manipulation and other 
insider trading strategies, and provoked a national debate on whether US financial markets 
are rigged.
8
 The New York State Attorney General pursued an inquiry into ―unseemly 
practices in the high frequency trading business, which ultimately led to legal action against 
Barclays Bank in June 2014, and further inquiries into a string of leading international 
investment banks high frequency trading and dark pools. The floodgates were open for a 
tsunami of private class actions against 27 financial service firms and 14 national securities 
exchanges alleging that the defendants HFT practices in the US equities markets violated the 




anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Further actions were filed against the 
CME Group, and the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, with similar allegations 
regarding trading in the US derivatives markets.
9
 
Greg Medcraft, the chairman of IOSCO and  of the corporate regulator ASIC, later confirmed 
to an Australian Federal parliamentary committee: ―Regulators around the world are very 
concerned about the systemic risk on high frequency trading. We have already had the flash 
crash, we have had Knight Capital, but there have been incidents in other major markets as 
well.‖ His colleague, ASIC deputy commissioner Belinda Gibson, suggested algorithmic and 
high frequency trading is sometimes manipulative or illegal, but it is often simply predatory 
on other investors. In response, ASIC proposed mandatory computer ―kill‖ switches that stop 
trades which appear to be out of control. In addition, regulators are increasingly concerned 
about the increase of trading taking place in ―dark pools‖, and are encouraging trades back 
out on to open exchanges. As Mathew Rossi a partner in Mayer Brown law firm comments, 
―... It is clear that trading firms, brokers and exchanges engaged in HFT are coming under 
increasing pressure in the US from private litigants, securities regulators and criminal law 
enforcement authorities. As HFT techniques are increasingly used in non-US markets, the 
strategies and tactics used by private litigants and regulators in the United States may soon be 
expected outside of the United States…‖10 
 
The Evolution of Electronic Trading 
The rapid adoption internationally of high frequency trading is significantly changing the 
nature of capital markets, as traditional floor-based trading between identifiable buyers and 
sellers is replaced by massive amounts of automated trading.
11
 This is the current stage of the 
historical evolution of the use of technology to make trading faster, smarter and more intense, 
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and at each stage the stakes have been raised with the potential risk exponentially increasing 
from the fortunes of a few informed (or ill-informed) speculators, to the possible ruin of vast 
numbers of innocent people who have entrusted their wealth to others: 
―History repeats and informs in market technologies. From the days when front 
running involved actual running to the ―Victorian Internet era‖ brought on by 
Telegraphy…We think that the overwhelming influence of computers remaking the 
landscape around Wall Street today is something new, but… In its day, telegraphy 
was seen as the same kind of overwhelming transformation that the Internet is today. 
In many ways, the telegraph was more dramatic since it was the first time in history 
that a message could be sent beyond the horizon instantaneously‖.12 
The increasing dependence on computer technology commenced in 1971 with the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) which became the 
world‘s first electronic stock market with an electronic quotation system to trade securities, 
which prompted other stock exchanges internationally to allow the electronic transmission of 
orders to buy and sell securities. Program Trading followed in the 1980s, allowing 
computerised trading involving different portfolio strategies, for example a program could 




Electronic trading was boosted in the 1990s with the introduction of Electronic 
Communications Networks (ECNs), allowing trading of financial securities outside of official 
exchanges. The greater speed and efficiency of ECNs, lower costs and fewer manual errors 
led to increased investment in algorithmic trading, and unsettling the monopoly of the NYSE 
and NASDAQ, the US SEC passed the Regulation of Alternative Trading Systems which 
facilitated the emergence of a range of alternative electronic trading platforms.
14
 Further 




reforms encouraging algorithmic trading included the decimalisation of US Stock Exchanges 
with prices quoted in cents rather than fractions of a dollar which narrowed spreads:  
―Smaller tick sizes—the smallest increment by which the price of a financial instrument can 
move—caused an explosion in market data volumes. Processing such high volumes began to 
exceed the data assimilation capabilities of human traders, whereas machines were ideally 
suited to handling thousands of data points per second.‖15 Finally the 2005 SEC Regulation 
National Market System, which required orders to be posted nationally, not just at individual 
exchanges, allowed traders to leverage small price differences if they could take advantage of 
the momentary lag between them.
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This progressive digitalisation of the trading process and of stock exchanges themselves set 
the scene for the frantic activities of the high frequency traders. The defence of high 
frequency trading is that in the digital age they are the market makers, providing liquidity 
which contributes to market quality and efficiency in the price formation process. However 
there is a lingering sense by other market participants that they are unable to keep pace with 
the increasingly large investments in trading technology, and are vulnerable as a result. With 
the increasing scale of high frequency trading regulators are concerned particularly about 
potentially harmful effects in adverse market conditions, and are emphasising the need to 
subject high frequency trading to prudential and organisational requirements and to the 
supervision by a competent authority.
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The juxtaposition of the frequent sage calls for a long-term view of investment in order to 
provide a stable investment platform for business, and the due returns to long term 
beneficiaries in superannuation funds, insurance funds and mutual funds and the acute 
explanations of the increasing prevalence of high-frequency trading is deeply ironic, and 
starkly highlights the complexities and contradictions of contemporary finance markets.
18
  





High frequency trading is an intense expression of the digital myopia that is sweeping the 
business world: 
―Is the world becoming short-sighted? As individuals, it sometimes feels that way. 
Information is streamed in ever greater volumes and at ever rising velocities. 
Timelines for decision-making appear to have been compressed. Pressures to deliver 
immediate results seem to have intensified. Tenure patterns for some of our most 
important life choices (marriage, jobs, money) are in secular decline.
19
 Some have 
called this the era of ―quarterly capitalism‖.20 These forces may be altering not just 
the way we act, but also the way we think. Neurologically, our brains are adapting to 
increasing volumes and velocities of information by shortening attention spans. 
Technological innovation, such as the world wide web, may have caused a permanent 
neurological rewiring, as did previous technological revolutions such as the printing 
press and typewriter.
21
 Like a transistor radio, our brains may be permanently retuning 
to a shorter wave-length.‖22 
Advances in financial, computing and communications technologies have facilitated the 
dramatic reduction of the average holding period of equity: on the NYSE this has diminished 
from 7 years in the 1950s to 6 months today. More worryingly as much as 60% of trading 
volume on the NYSE is measured now in milliseconds, and other exchanges are similarly 
overwhelmed. The more impact short-term traders have in the market, the more volatile 
prices will be as these become less rooted in the fundamentals of the value of corporations 
traded, as Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England has documented. Long term innovation 
and investment performance requires attention to more than short term financial metrics. As 




Lin recounts automated programs responding to bad data or extraneous stimuli can 
potentially cause catastrophic harm to financial institutions before remedial measures can be 
implemented.
23
As Haldane highlights high frequency trading is moving beyond human 
control and becoming ‗too fast to save‘: 
―For the first time in human history, machines can execute trades far faster than 
humans can intervene. The gap is set to widen. In some respects the 2010 Flash Crash 
and the 1987 stock market crash have common genes – algorithmic amplification of 
stress. But they differ in one critical respect. Regulatory intervention could feasibly 
have forestalled the 1987 crash. By the time of the Flash Crash, regulators  might 
have blinked  - literally, blinked – and missed their chance.‖24 
 
The US Flash Crash 
On 6 May 2010 the prices of many U.S. based equity products experienced an extraordinarily 
rapid decline and recovery, as major equity indices in the securities and futures markets 
plunged 6% in minutes, and then quickly rebounded: 
―The so-called ―Flash Crash‖ sent shocks waves through global equity markets. The 
Dow Jones experienced its largest ever intraday point fall, losing $1 trillion of market 
value in the space of half an hour. History is full of such fat-tailed falls in stocks. Was 
this just another to add to the list, perhaps compressed into a smaller time window? 
No. This one was different. For a time, equity prices of some of the world‘s biggest 
companies were in free-fall. They appeared to be in a race to zero. Peak to trough, 
Accenture shares fell by over 99%, from $40 to $0.01. At precisely the same time, 
shares in Sotheby‘s rose three thousand-fold, from $34 to $99,999.99.‖25 
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This near disaster resulted from a large fundamental trader against a backdrop of unusually 
high volatility and thinning liquidity initiated a sell program to sell a total of 75,000E-Mini 
contracts (valued at approximately $4.1 billion) as a hedge to an existing equity position. The 
trader executed the sell program via an automated execution algorithm (Sell Algorithm) that 
was programmed to feed orders into the June 2010 E-Mini market to target an execution rate 
set to 9% of the trading volume calculated over the previous minute, but without regard to 
price or time. With the Sell Algorithm only targeting trading volume, and neither price nor 
time, it executed the sell program in just 20 minutes, and chaos ensued.
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Many of the US market 8,000 individual equities and exchange traded funds suffered price 
declines of between 5% and 15%, while over 20,000 trades across 300 securities were 
executed at prices more than 60% away from their values moments before. In the midst of 
this chaotic algorithmically programmed frantic buying and selling the HFT‘s were buyers of 
the initial batch of orders submitted by the Sell Algorithm, however as conditions rapidly 
deteriorated ―lacking sufficient demand from fundamental buyers or cross-market 
arbitrageurs, HFTs began to quickly buy and then resell contracts to each other – generating a 
―hot-potato‖ volume effect as the same positions were rapidly passed back and forth. 
Between 2:45:13 pm and 2:45:27 pm, HFTs traded over 27,000 contracts, which accounted 
for about 49 per cent of the total trading volume, while buying only about 200 additional 
contracts net.‖27 
The joint report from the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission and the U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission concluded one key lesson is that under stressed market 
conditions, the automated execution of a large sell order can trigger extreme price 
movements, especially if the automated execution algorithm does not take prices into 
account. Moreover, the interaction between automated execution programs and algorithmic 
trading strategies can quickly erode liquidity and result in disorderly markets.  As the events 




of May 6 demonstrate, especially in times of significant volatility, high trading volume is not 




The CFTC-SEC Report went on to comment that many market participants employed their 
own versions of a trading pause, whether generally or in particular software products, based 
on different combinations of market signals. If many market participants withdraw in this 
way a disorderly market can result. In contrast having a general trading pause can be an 
effective way of providing time for market participants to reassess their strategies, for 
algorithms to reset their parameters and for an orderly market to be re-established. The SEC 
developed a circuit breaker to pause trading across US markets in a security that has 
experienced a 10% price change in the previous five minutes, and on 10 June 2010 approved 
the application of this circuit breaker to securities included in the S & P 500.
29
 However it is 
clear that neither financial markets nor regulators fully comprehend the potential impact of 
high frequency trading, or regulate control its activity in any meaningful way, powerfully 




High Frequency Trading 
High frequency trading employs sophisticated computer programming to execute stock 
transactions at extremely fast speed in order to take advantage of small and often momentary 
changes in stock prices. With this new found acceleration the capacity of exchanges as 
measured by order messages per day has gone from one million in 1995 to hundreds of 
millions by 2009, and during the same period throughput as measured by messages per 
second has gone from 20 to over 100,000.
31
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High frequency traders use different trading strategies but there are some common 
characteristics including trading on their own account rather than on behalf of clients, 
utilising high speed computer programs to generate, route and execute orders rapidly on 
multiple exchanges, maintaining unhedged positions for small fractions of a second, and 
submit high rates of orders that are cancelled before the order is executed. In order for these 
trading strategies to work high frequency traders need speed advantages. To achieve this 
speed these traders pay to ‗co-locate‘ or ‗cross-connect‘ their trading computers in the 
buildings of public exchanges or dark pools in order to increase the speed with which they 
receive information, and in order to be able to rapidly place and cancel orders. Paying a 
premium for ‗direct data feeds‘ from the public exchanges that are faster and have more 
information than data available to other investors. As the Attorney General of the state of 
New York claims: 
Those speed and technology advantages allow high frequency traders to profile the 
pending orders on an exchange in order to detect the presence of large pending orders, 
usually from institutional investors. This ―information leakage,‖ allows high 
frequency traders to trade ahead of an anticipated stock purchase or otherwise have an 
impact on price. Speed and technology advantages also allow for strategies that seek 
to exploit the small, temporary pricing dislocations in a security that occur because of 
differential and/or delayed access to market data. This strategy is sometimes referred 
to as ―latency arbitrage,‖ because the trader is seeking to exploit the relative slowness, 
or ―latency,‖ in the transmission of market data experienced by other participants. 
Barclays itself commonly labelled these types of high frequency strategies as ―toxic,‖ 
―predatory,‖ or ―aggressive.‖ Ordinary investors generally seek to avoid interactions 
with high frequency traders because of the effect those sorts of strategies can have on 
an investor‘s trading performance.‖32 




―Latency‖ refers to the time it takes from sending an order to it being executed, the critical 
advantage of high frequency trading: 
―A decade ago, execution times on some electronic trading platforms dipped 
decisively below the one second barrier. As recently as a few years ago, trade 
execution times reached ―blink speed‖ – as fast as the blink of an eye. At the time that 
seemed eye-watering, at around 300–400 milli-seconds or less than a third of a 
second. But more recently the speed limit has shifted from milli-seconds to micro-
seconds – millionths of a second. Several trading platforms now offer trade execution 
measured in micro-seconds …The lower limit for trade execution appears to be 
around 10 micro-seconds. This means it would in principle be possible to execute 
around 40,000 back-to-back trades in the blink of an eye. If supermarkets ran HFT 
programmes, the average household could complete its shopping for a lifetime in 
under a second…It is clear from these trends that trading technologists are involved in 
an arms race. And it is far from over. The new trading frontier is nano-seconds – 
billionths of a second. And the twinkle in technologists‘ (unblinking) eye is pico-
seconds – trillionths of a second. HFT firms talk of a ―race to zero‖. This is the 
promised land of zero ―latency‖ where trading converges on its natural (Planck‘s) 
limit, the speed of light.‖33 
 
The SEC characterises high frequency trading as typically involving: 
1. Use of extraordinarily high speed and sophisticated programs for generating, 
routing, and executing orders. 
2. Use of co-location services and individual data feeds offered by exchanges  
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and others to minimize network and other latencies. 
3. Very short time-frames for establishing and liquidating positions. 
4. Submission of numerous orders that are cancelled shortly after submission. 
5. Ending the trading day in as close to a flat position as possible (that is, not carrying   




High Frequency Trading Strategies and Risks 
Distinct types of high frequency trading firms include independent proprietary firms, which 
use private funds and specific strategies which remain secretive, and may act as market 
makers generating automatic buy and sell orders continuously throughout the day. Broker-
dealer proprietary desks are part of traditional broker-dealer firms but are not related to their 
client business, and are operated by the largest investment banks. Thirdly hedge funds focus 




Today strategies using algorithmic trading and HFT play a central role on financial 
exchanges, alternative markets, and banks‘ internalized (over-the-counter) dealings. Agarwal 
distinguished high frequency traders from the rest of the market which generally employs 
algorithmic trading: 
―High frequency traders typically act in a proprietary capacity, making use of a 
number of strategies and generating a very large number of trades every single 
day. They leverage technology and algorithms from end-to-end of the investment 




chain—from market data analysis and the operation of a specific trading strategy to 
the generation, routing, and execution of orders and trades. What differentiates HFT 
from algorithmic trading is the high frequency turnover of positions as well as its 
implicit reliance on ultra-low latency connection and speed of the system.‖36 
 
The use of algorithms in computerised exchange trading has experienced a long evolution 
with the increasing digitalisation of exchanges: 
―Over time, algorithms have continuously evolved: while initial first-generation 
algorithms – fairly simple in their goals and logic – were pure trade execution algos, 
second-generation algorithms – strategy implementation algos – have become much 
more sophisticated and are typically used to produce own trading signals which are 
then executed by trade execution algos. Third-generation algorithms include 
intelligent logic that learns from market activity and adjusts the trading strategy of the 
order based on what the algorithm perceives is happening in the market. HFT is not a 
strategy per se but rather a technologically more advanced method of implementing 
particular trading strategies. The objective of HFT strategies is to seek to benefit from 
market liquidity imbalances or other short-term pricing inefficiencies.‖37 
 
While algorithms are employed by most traders in contemporary markets
38
 the intense focus 
on speed and the momentary holding periods are the unique practices of the high frequency 
traders as Aldridge indicates
39
 (see Figure 3).  
Figure 3    
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High Frequency Trading versus Algorithmic Trading  
and Traditional Long-Term Investing 
 
As noted the defence of high frequency trading is built around the principles that it increases 
liquidity, narrows spreads, and improves market efficiency.
40
 The high number of trades 
made by HFT traders results in greater liquidity in the market. Algorithmic trading has 
resulted in the prices of securities being updated more quickly with more competitive bid-ask 
prices, and narrowing spreads. Finally HFT enables prices to reflect information more 
quickly and accurately, ensuring accurate pricing at smaller time intervals.
41
 But there are 
critical differences between high frequency traders and traditional market makers: 
i. HFT do not have an affirmative market making obligation, that is they are not 
obliged to provide liquidity by constantly displaying two sides quotes, which may 
translate into a lack of liquidity during volatile conditions. 
ii. HFT contribute little market depth due to the marginal size of their quotes, which 
may result in larger orders having to transact with many small orders, and this 
may impact on overall transaction costs. 
iii. HFT quotes are barely accessible due to the extremely short duration for which 




Besides the shallowness of the HFT contribution to liquidity, are the real fears of how HFT 
can compound and magnify risk by the rapidity of its actions: 
―There is evidence that high-frequency algorithmic trading also has some positive benefits for 
investors by narrowing spreads—the difference between the price at which a buyer is willing 
to purchase a financial instrument and the price at which a seller is willing to sell it—and by 




increasing liquidity at each decimal point. However, a major issue for regulators and 
policymakers is the extent to which high-frequency trading, unfiltered sponsored access, and 
co-location amplify risks, including systemic risk, by increasing the speed at which trading 
errors or fraudulent trades can occur.‖43 
Although there have always been occasional trading errors and episodic volatility spikes in 
markets, the speed, automation and interconnectedness of today‘s markets create a different 
scale of risk. These risks demand that exchanges and market participants employ effective 
quality management systems and sophisticated risk mitigation controls adapted to these new 
dynamics in order to protect against potential threats to market stability arising from 
technology malfunctions or episodic illiquidity. 
However there are more deliberate aspects of HFT strategies which may present serious 
problems for market structure and functioning, and where conduct may be illegal, for 
example in order anticipation seeks to ascertain the existence of large buyers or sellers in the 
marketplace and then to trade ahead of those buyers and sellers in anticipation that their large 
orders will move market prices. A momentum strategy involves initiating a series of orders 
and trades in an attempt to ignite a rapid price move.
44
 
HFT strategies can resemble traditional forms of market manipulation that violate the 
Exchange Act according to the SEC: 
a. Spoofing and layering occurs when traders create a false appearance of market 
activity by entering multiple non-bona fide orders on one side of the market at 
increasing or decreasing prices in order to induce others to buy or sell the stock at a 
price altered by the bogus orders. 
b. Painting the tape involves placing successive small amount of buy orders at 
increasing prices in order to stimulate increased demand. 
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c. Quote Stuffing and price fade are additional HFT dubious practices: quote stuffing is 
a practice that floods the market with huge numbers of orders and cancellations in 
rapid succession which may generate buying or selling interest, or compromise the 
trading position of other market participants. Order or price fade involves the rapid 
cancellation of orders in response to other trades.
45
 
The World Federation of Exchanges insists: ―Exchanges are committed to protecting market 
stability and promoting orderly markets, and understand that a robust and resilient risk 
control framework adapted to today‘s high speed markets, is a cornerstone of enhancing 
investor confidence.‖46  However this ‗robust and resilient risk control framework‘ seems 
lacking, including in the dark pools now established for trading that were initially proposed 
as safer than the open market. 
 
Dark Pools 
In addition to the 11 public stock exchanges in the United States there are dozens of privately 
owned and operated trading venues, including venues known as ‗dark pools.‘47 While public 
stock exchanges match tens of millions of orders to buyers and sellers each day, and these are 
generally visible to participants, and executions of orders are posted immediately. Public 
exchanges immediately display to the market the submission of pending stock orders, and 
dark pools do not. “Dark pools, defined in contrast to "lit" trading venues where trading 
intentions and activity are visible, provide access to non-displayed liquidity. A dark pool is an 
OTC (over-the-counter) venue for reporting purposes, which has the practical value that 
unmatched trade orders are not displayed on an open order book. The use of dark pools is 
typically found where disclosure of trading intent might prove injurious to price efficiency. 
For example, moving a large block of shares onto the market might impact counterparty 




pricing; feeding the same block through a dark pool (in smaller lots) will conceal the size of 
the overall trade.‖48  This has attracted an estimated 40 per cent of all US equity trades to 
dark pools, where it is believed there is greater protection from predatory trading by high 
frequency traders or other aggressive trading strategies. An explanation for the retreat into 
dark pools is provided by Thomas Caldwell, CEO of Caldwell Securities Ltd.: 
“Large institutional investors know that if they start trying to push through a large 
block of shares at a certain price – even if the block is broken into many small trades 
on several ATSs and markets — they can trigger a flood of high-frequency orders that 
immediately move market prices to the institution‘s disadvantage. . . . That‘s why 
institutions have flocked to so-called dark pools operated by ATSs such as Instinet, 
and individual dealers like Goldman Sachs.  The pools allow traders to offer prices 
without publicly revealing their identities and tipping their hand.‖49 
 
Because these large, dark pools are opaque to other investors and to regulators, they inhibit 
the free trade that depends on open and transparent auction markets to work, but are  
considered by institutional investors as a safer place to trade than the open market. The 
existence and extensive use of dark pools is an indication of how markets have become 
fragmented and eroded by the activities of high frequency trading and other aggressive 
predatory strategies:  
―…Risks to market integrity and efficiency do not have to arise solely from a major  
shock such as the flash crash. Regulators are cognisant of the possibility that the 
confidence of some investors in the efficiency and integrity of the market (and 
possibly their willingness to trade) by the ongoing development of algorithmic trading 
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and HFT, may lower investors‘ confidence and, possibly, reduce traditional market 
participants‘ willingness to trade.‖50 
 
Sharks in Dark Pools 
On 25 June 2014 the Attorney General of the state of New York Eric T. Schneiderman took 
action against Barclay‘s Capital Inc and Barclay‘s PLC claiming ―fraud and deceit by one of 
the world‘s largest banks.‖ 51 It was alleged by the Attorney General: 
―The facts in this case concern a major business division in Barclays‘ New York 
office, the Equities Electronic Trading division. In that division, Barclays operates a 
private securities trading venue known as a ―dark pool.‖ From 2011 to the present, 
Barclays embarked on a business strategy to dramatically increase the market share of 
its dark pool, with the goal of making it the largest dark pool in the United States. 
Barclays accomplished this through a series of false statements to clients and the 
investing public about how, and for whose benefit, Barclays operates its dark pool. In 
short, contrary to Barclays‘ representations that it implemented special safeguards to 
protect clients from ―aggressive,‖ ―predatory,‖ or ―toxic‖ high frequency traders, 
Barclays has operated its dark pool to favor high frequency traders. Barclays has 
actively sought to attract such traders to its dark pool, and it has given them 
advantages over others trading in the pool.‖52 
It was further alleged that Barclay‘s wrong doing included: 
i) Falsifying marketing materials purporting to show the extent and type of high 
frequency trading in its dark pool, which intentionally excluded the dark 




pool‘s then largest participant, a high frequency trading firm Barclay‘s knew 
engaged in predatory behaviour in the dark pool. 
ii) Falsely marketed the percentage of aggressive high frequency trading activity 
in its dark pool, asserting to clients and the investing public that it was less 
than 10%, while secretly indicating to one HFT firm that the level of such 
activity was at least 25%. 
iii) Falsely representing to clients that its Liquidity Profiling tool analysed each 
interaction in the dark pool to ―protect clients from predatory trading‖ when in 
reality Barclay‘s failed to remove or profile predatory traders in its dark pool, 
and granted overrides to high frequency trading firms, and to Barclay‘s own 
internal trading desks which employed aggressive trading strategies, in order 
to make them appear less toxic than they really were. 
iv) Falsely represented to clients that it routed clients orders for securities to 
trading venues in a manner that did not favour Barclays‘ own dark pool, when 
a detailed analysis by one major institutional investor showed it was routing 
and executing the vast bulk of the client‘s orders to Barclay‘s own dark pool. 
v) While marketing its dark pool to institutional investors as offering protection 
from high frequency traders, Barclay‘s secretly gave high frequency trading 
firms informational and other advantages over other clients trading in the dark 
pool, allowing high frequency traders to maximise the effectiveness of their 
aggressive trading strategies in the dark pool.
53
 
The detailed analysis contained in the Attorney General‘s summons provokes stark images of 
unseen sharks preying on unsuspecting victims in dark pools of intense unseen trading. 
―Barclays grew its dark pool by telling investors they were diving into safe waters,‖ said Eric 
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Schneiderman. ―According to the lawsuit, Barclays‘ dark pool was full of predators – there at 
Barclays‘ invitation.‖54 The Attorney General alleges that:  
―On January 16, 2014, senior leaders in the (Barclay‘s) Equities Electronic Trading 
division were provided an analysis identifying over a dozen major high frequency 
trading firms engaged in significant trading activity in Barclays‘ dark pool. That 
analysis discussed those firms‘ history of sending ―toxic‖ order flow. One high 
frequency trading firm was described in the analysis as ―historically . . . very toxic.‖ 
Another firm was described as having ―[trading activity that] is very toxic, and the 
client is up-front about this.‖ Another firm was described as having ―[k]nown latency 
arbitrage flow‖ in the dark pool. Barclays has not denied any of those firms (or others) 
access to its dark pool, despite its representations that it will identify ―aggressive 
behavior, [and] take corrective action‖ to ―refuse a client access‖ to the dark pool if 
such aggressive or toxic high frequency trading strategies are discovered.‖55 
The Attorney-General alleges further that Barclay‘s impeded efforts by Barclay‘s executives 
to inform investors of what was occurring: 
 ―In October, 2013, Barclays prepared a trading analysis for a major institutional 
investor that services millions of individual accounts both inside the United States and 
abroad (―Institutional Investor‖). The analysis determined that: 
• Approximately 88% of this Institutional Investor‘s sampled trades in dark venues 
were executing in Barclays‘ dark pool; 
• Approximately 60% of the trading counterparties for the Institutional Investor‘s 
sampled orders were high frequency trading firms… 





In preparation for a meeting with the Institutional Investor to explain these findings, two 
senior Directors prepared a PowerPoint presentation that included the results of the trading 
analysis. Two days before the scheduled meeting, one of those Directors was called into a 
meeting with senior leadership in the Equities Electronic Trading division, who instructed 
him not to disclose the findings to the client. According to this Director, ―[t]here was no 
suggestion at that meeting, or at any other point, that the analysis was wrong,‖ merely that it 
should not be shared with the client because it reflected poorly on Barclays. Despite the 
pressure from senior leadership, this Director declined to withhold the findings from 
Institutional Investor. The next day, and prior to the scheduled meeting with the Institutional 
Investor, this Director was fired.‖56 
 
In response to the summons Barclay‘s Bank fired back a 42 page motion to dismiss the 
Attorney General‘s complaint, insisting the bank planned ―to mount a firm defence against 
the allegations, which have hobbled its dark-pool operation and damaged Barclays's 
reputation on Wall Street. The London bank asked the court to dismiss the case, which it said 
is ‗based on clear and substantial factual errors.‘‖57 Barclays said its customers are  
―…Highly sophisticated traders and asset managers responsible for investing millions 
or billions of dollars of assets, who execute trades across multiple markets and ATSs, 
are capable of closely monitoring the quality of execution they receive based on 
extensive data, and can select from multiples platforms on which to execute their 
trades based on detailed execution data, not on the glossy marketing brochures or 
quotes from magazine articles the New York Attorney General cites.‖58 
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Moreover Barclay‘s claimed its clients were aware that its dark pool allowed trading by high-
speed firms:  
―…The materials cited in the Complaint demonstrates that they were intended only 
for sophisticated clients and that they transparently disclosed the volume of HFT and 
―aggressive‖ trading on LX. Contrary to the Complaint‘s allegations, the very 
Barclays marketing materials on which the NYAG relies made clear that HFTs were a 
substantial part of LX traders and transparently marketed LX as a platform on which 
clients could benefit from the liquidity provided by HFTs, while having the option of 
reducing exposure to ―aggressive‖ order flow.‖59 
 
Barclay‘s concludes the Attorney General's complaint "fails to identify any fraud, 
establishing no material misstatements, no identified victims and no actual harm.‖60 
Meanwhile the Attorney General‘s office has extended its scrutiny to other large dark pools at 
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank and UBS, and the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission has launched an inquiry into dark pool trading. 
 
Conclusions: Regulating High Frequency Trading and Dark Pools 
On the 22 September 2010 the SEC chair Mary Schapiro signaled US authorities were 
considering the introduction of regulations targeted at HFT: "...High frequency trading firms 
have a tremendous capacity to affect the stability and integrity of the equity markets. 
Currently, however, high frequency trading firms are subject to very little in the way of 
obligations either to protect that stability by promoting reasonable price continuity in tough 
times, or to refrain from exacerbating price volatility."
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However regulating an industry working towards moving as fast as the speed of light is no 
ordinary administrative task: ―Modern finance is undergoing a fundamental transformation. 
Artificial intelligence, mathematical models, and supercomputers have replaced human 
intelligence, human deliberation, and human execution…. Modern finance is becoming 
cyborg finance— an industry that is faster, larger, more complex, more global, more 
interconnected, and less human.‖62 Lin proposes a number of principles for regulating this 
cyber finance industry: 
i. Update antiquated paradigms of reasonable investors and compartmentalised 
institutions, and confront the emerging institutional realities, and realise the 
old paradigms of governance of markets may be ill-suited for the new finance 
industry; 
ii. Enhance disclosure which recognises the complexity and technological 
capacities of the new finance industry; 
iii. Adopt regulations to moderate the velocities of finance realising that as these 
approach the speed of light they may contain more risks than rewards for the 
new financial industry; 
iv. Introduce smarter coordination harmonising financial regulation  beyond 




Electronic markets will require international coordination, surveillance and regulation. 
―The high-frequency trading environment has the potential to generate errors and losses at a 
speed and magnitude far greater than that in a floor or screen-based trading environment… 
Moreover, issues related to risk management of these technology-dependent trading systems 
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are numerous and complex and cannot be addressed in isolation within domestic financial 
markets. For example, placing limits on high-frequency algorithmic trading or restricting 
Un-filtered sponsored access and co-location within one jurisdiction might only drive trading 
firms to another jurisdiction where controls are less stringent.‖64 
 
In these regulatory endeavours it will be vital to remember that all innovation is not 
intrinsically good and might be inherently dangerous, and the objective is to make a more 
efficient and equitable financial system, not simply a faster system: ―Despite its fast 
computers and credit derivatives, the current financial system does not seem better at 
transferring funds from savers to borrowers than the financial system of 1910.‖65 The tragedy 
is that under the guise of technological advance and sophistication we could be destroying the 
capacity of financial markets to fulfil their essential purpose, as Haldane eloquently states: 
―An efficient capital market transfers savings today into investment tomorrow and growth the 
day after. In that way, it boosts welfare. Short-termism in capital markets could interrupt this 
transfer. If promised returns the day after tomorrow fail to induce saving today, there will be 


















Figure  1     High-Frequency Percentage of Volume of US Equity Shares Traded  2006-2014e 
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